Complaining before and after 1984 by Wexelblatt, Robert
Masthead Logo The Iowa Review
Volume 16
Issue 2 Spring-Summer Article 14
1986
Complaining before and after 1984
Robert Wexelblatt
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.uiowa.edu/iowareview
Part of the Creative Writing Commons
This Contents is brought to you for free and open access by Iowa Research Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Iowa Review by an
authorized administrator of Iowa Research Online. For more information, please contact lib-ir@uiowa.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wexelblatt, Robert. "Complaining before and after 1984." The Iowa Review 16.2 (1986): 68-87. Web.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.17077/0021-065X.3387
Complaining Before and After 1984 
Robert Wexelblatt 
WE ALL KNOW COMPLAINING when we hear it. All the same, I 
think it proper and in the spirit of philosophy to begin with a little bit of 
definition; at least it will give me something to be inconsistent about later 
on. 
In the vast and not completely charted realm of dissatisfaction, com 
plaining is the intimate opposite of wishing. Intimate opposites, inci 
dentally, are things like men and women: from the back you can some 
times mistake the one for the other. A wish means, at base: "I do not want 
to be as I am, to be what I am. And I shall relieve myself of this distasteful 
reality through delightful if wholly unrealizable fantasy." So, to wish is to 
deny what is real. Complaining, on the other hand, is apparently the very 
worst kind of acceptance of reality. Fundamentally, to complain is to say: 
"I am stuck where I am, as I am, and with the bad things that are happen 
ing to me. But I will seek a perverse and malicious relief in whining about 
it. Out loud." So, because one rejects and the other accepts reality, wish 
ing and complaining are opposites; yet they are intimates because both 
agree that reality is decidedly unsatisfactory. 
You might say that complaining is grown-up wishing or that wishing 
is what complaining regresses into. I mean this quite literally. An unhappy 
and imaginative fourth-grader is apt to do a good deal of wishing, but if he 
grows up to be a miserable certified public accountant, he will probably do 
a lot of complaining. Conversely, a large number of complaints wind up in 
wishes, though these are customarily negative and rather joyless ones. 
You may have noticed that after a good long bout of whining, people will 
express all sorts of merely vacant or rhetorical wishes, such as: "I wish I 
hadn't, didn't, needn't, wouldn't, or weren't." We can all furnish our 
own predicates. 
Complaining is also, of course, the most popular competitive sport in 
the kingdom of the dissatisfied. Materialists will one-up each other with 
vacations and sports cars, intellectuals with book titles and obscure allu 
sions, social climbers with dropped names and invitations?but the dis 
satisfied characteristically do it with complaints, as in "You think you had 
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it bad? That's nothing. Just look at my scar!" In such a competition, the 
formulation of a really unanswerable complaint is as satisfying as spiking 
the ball in the end-zone. 
Now, stoicism is invariably impressive and an uncomplaining tempera 
ment is always highly reputable. I might as well at once admit the ob 
vious?that complaining has a poor reputation, though most of us do a 
great deal of it. Complaining is in this respect not unlike sneezing in 
public: I expect we have all been guilty of both sneezing and whining ?in 
fact, there are times when even the most self-controlled of us simply can 
not help doing so?but this does not prevent us from feeling little sym 
pathy for those who do either in our vicinity. Complaining ?there is no 
getting away from it ?is an undignified topic. Dignified things, like am 
bassadors and grandfather clocks, always appear incapable of complaining, 
and the most dignified people at their most dignified moments are utterly 
beyond it: Marcus Brutus accepting defeat at Philippi, Spiro Agnew 
pleading no defense, Charlton Heston expiring on Mount Pisgah, and so 
forth. Why, then, look into such an unpromising matter? 
First, I have spent an inordinate amount of time in schools, especially 
universities. While I cannot speak about such institutions as the Coast 
Guard or the World Bank, I have always been struck by the intensity and 
persistence of complaining at virtually every level of education. I spent a 
couple of years at Brandeis University, for instance, and my experiences 
there led me to suggest that the University's lengthy, hopeful and surgical 
motto ("Truth even unto its innermost parts") really ought to be amended 
simply to "It's not fair," as I heard the latter phrase so much more often 
than the former. In Latin it wouldn't sound so bad, actually: "Non aequus 
est," perhaps emblazoned on a shield with unbalanced scales. 
Students complain as a matter of course; it is a mode of discourse natural 
to the condition of their transitional and perpetually graded lives: they are 
too old for childish wishing and too young for taciturn resignation. But 
professors are likewise very accomplished at complaining, and at every 
rank. There are, for instance, those who complain that they do not have 
tenure and those who, no doubt feeling trapped by security, complain that 
they do; those who complain that their students are as passive as oil paint 
ings and those who complain that their pupils continually interrupt lec 
tures with annoying questions. Hard though it may be to believe, even ad 
ministrators have been know to moan on occasion ?and in public. "If any 
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man wishes to become humbled and mortified, let him become President 
of Harvard College," whined the eleventh President of Harvard College. 
For all I know about it, griping may be an ineluctable accompaniment to 
the educational process, like the figured bass in a concerto grosso. In any 
case, though, an examination of complaining does not seem out of order 
to me, since I work in a place that enjoys so much of it. 
In fact, this idea of looking closely at complaining is only indirectly 
mine; it was actually- given to me by a 32-year-old woman named Vir 
ginia. She was and continues to be a character in a long story I wrote one 
summer. Not just a character, but the narrator. 
Narrators can get hold of all sorts of strange ideas. They are wilful and 
notoriously difficult to control. Perhaps this is because they think they are 
authors. Anyway, at one point Virginia became attached to the idea of 
complaining and wouldn't let go. In the story, she is opening up an art 
gallery, her own business, and is in a perpetual tizzy about all the people 
she must cope with: her artists, her children, her stolidly uncomplaining 
husband, her carpenter, her accountant, etc. She is a spunky entrepreneur 
but nervously calls herself a "cowardly suburban Mother Courage." Like 
most modern narrators, of either gender, Ginny is pretty self-conscious, 
and the anguish of going into business makes her fully aware for the first 
time that complaining had always been one of her particular pleasures and 
greatest talents. Much to my surprise, though she did not at first strike me 
as having a philosophical bone in her imaginary body, Ginny insisted on 
pursuing this insight further. I begged her just to get on with the story, 
but she insisted: "... it would be letting myself off far too easily to make 
light of my complaining. What I want is to do just the opposite; I want to 
make heavy of it, like those philosophers I was compelled to read during 
my sophomore year." 
I am unsure just where Virginia spent her sophomore year, incidentally, 
but since philosophers say the same things everywhere it scarcely matters. 
Anyway, here is some of what she had to say: 
"... The whines of dogs and shudders of horses notwithstanding, I 
have come to believe that complaining is one of the truly distinctive 
human activities. At the very least, it's one that we have perfected. That is 
to say, we are complaining featherless bipeds. Just about our whole 
culture is a sort of complaining or, to put it a little more philosophically, 
complaining is our culture's efficient cause. The Bible fairly bursts with 
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complaints (beginning with that business about the Garden of Eden and 
reaching a climax with Job); Prometheus Bound, the most primitive of 
Greek tragedies, is virtually nothing but whining; the sculpture of the 
Golden Age is an implied complaint (assuming Phidias himself was no 
mesomorph); music complains very gloriously, very lugubriously, de 
pending on the major or minor; the history of politics is certainly founded 
on 
complaining; poetry is, at base, the quintessence of lyrical bellyaching. 
And so on. 
"Like my kids, my artists are great complainers one and all . . . even 
when they have nothing to complain of except being themselves. And this 
is the real clue to the whole issue. The purest kind of complaining is never 
about anything external. That is only how it gets itself expressed: the 
teachers, the critics, the weather, the family, the car, or the economy must 
bear the brunt of all the interior displeasures. Voluptuous complaining, 
jagged complaining, lustrous complaining ?through these we inflict our 
irritation at being ourselves on those who are not ourselves. 'Sorry to com 
plain so much,' people will say with shocking hypocrisy. The apology 
itself is a complaint. 
"In complaint as in art, every generation must produce its own stuff. In 
fact, we can judge a generation on the quality of its complaining as well as 
on the objects it picks to complain about. One generation complains that 
it can't make up its mind between Protestantism and Catholicism, another 
that you can't buy a good five-cent cigar, a third that social justice is ir 
ritatingly elusive. And, of course, they all complain about the last genera 
tion and the next one, in that order. 
"Even the Stoics, as I dimly recall them, complained . . . they com 
plained quite shamelessly about the complaining of the non-Stoics. 
"As for happy people, they complain with surprising frequency because, 
being happy most of the time, it is simply impossible for them to bear in 
silence those rainy afternoons, those sleepless midnights when they are 
? 
no matter how happy by nature ?a little less than happy. Woe to the com 
panion of the unhappy happy person! 
"Men like to pretend that complaining is distinctively feminine; they 
have even reduced a myriad of the ills of our tangled innards to so many so 
called 'women's complaints.' But, in my experience, men are the greater 
complainers. Not in quantity perhaps, but in quality, just as women do 
most of the world's cooking while the least over-worked, most famous, 
and best-paid chefs are men." 
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Here I might say that I think Virginia's somewhat expansive idea of 
complaining is fundamentally an aesthetic one, and in this respect I quite 
agree with her. Some complaints, aesthetically speaking, really are better 
than others. 
While the psychologists' concept of a "hierarchy of needs" has always 
seemed to me something of a misplaced metaphor, a "hierarchy of com 
plaints" strikes me as just right. A hierarchy was originally a government 
of priests, which is what the Greek word literally means. Then Dionysius 
the Areopagite, who apparently knew everything worth knowing about 
the organizational chart of Paradise, used the term to designate the three 
ranks of angels, each rank having three orders for the sake of symmetry. 
But nowadays all that has been retained in common parlance of "hierar 
chy's" noble etymology is the Sesame Street notion that some things are 
above other things. 
This is just where I object to the psychologists' hierarchy of needs: that 
is, the notion that when you've had enough peanut-butter-and-jelly you 
want to meet Mick Jagger and then, perhaps, read a little Harold Robbins. 
The third need is not necessarily higher than the second, let alone the first. 
In fact, some people may achieve their very highest point, their apogee of 
needful expression, at the level of biology. For example, a man may be the 
most exquisite Lucullian gourmet and yet be satisfied to listen to a record 
ing of "Hey, Jude" by the 1001 Strings while polishing off his Sachertorte 
and smoking his Maria Mancini. 
On the other hand, a hierarchy in the aesthetics of complaining seems to 
me very apt. Some complaints are truly nobler than others, more elevated 
and refined. The same person who will tell a whining child in a station 
wagon to shut up and stop complaining about the length of the journey 
may pay the very strictest attention to a performance of Mahler's Kinder 
totenlieder. Of course, we will not admit that it is the sheer elegance of im 
aginary complaint that attracts us to Mahler's music; we are more likely to 
say it is his passionate self-expression. Well, the whining child is express 
ing himself no less passionately when he moans for the twentieth time, 
"Are we there yet?" 
Yes, you will say, but the child is only repeating the same irritating 
complaint. True, but then the poet R?ckert wrote well over two hundred 
elegies on the death of his children, from which Mahler drew five for his 
songs. 
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You will now object that R?ckert was lamenting a most serious and ir 
replaceable loss, while the child in the station wagon is merely complain 
ing about a trivial matter. Trivial to whom, I will have to ask in return. 
To us? But which of us really grieves for Mahler's musical empathy with 
R?ckert's terrible loss? More likely we will think of some loss of our own 
or even a literary one. No, on the criterion of sheer sincerity, genuine, 
spontaneous feeling, we should have to place the child's automotive com 
plaining higher than either R?ckert's poems or Mahler's songs. After all, 
the child's whining is whole-hearted and unmediated by any secondary 
considerations, whereas R?ckert forced himself to lament in rhyming 
couplets and Mahler in precisely weighed harmonies. If all the same we 
place Mahler's gorgeous grieving above the child's annoying whining, we 
might as well confess that it is because the one is beautiful and moving and 
the other ugly and exasperating. 
We also cannot make the criterion of our hierarchy the degree of 
seriousness of the matter being complained about. It was Hazlitt who 
pointed out that tragedy and comedy are both complaints about the 
difference between the way things are and the way they ought to be. In 
tragedy the matter of complaint is serious, while in comedy it tends to be 
trivial. No doubt this is why, as forms, tragedy has generally enjoyed 
greater prestige than comedy. However, as soon as we look at particular 
cases ?say, a solemn heroic tragedy by Otway and a Romantic comedy by 
Shakespeare ?we must confess that there is a higher quality of complain 
ing to be found in the comedy than in the tragedy. This is simply because 
Shakespeare's art is greater than Otway's ?not merely his language, 
which by itself can make good literature, but not great literature. Actu 
ally, it is Shakespeare's profound artist's grasp of the human capacity to do 
things ?things like complaining. Virginia would no doubt be quick to ob 
serve that Shakespeare's most famous play of all is largely devoted to com 
plaining. 
Virginia's idea about the huge element of complaining in western 
culture is not wholly frivolous. In fact, it reminded me of two anecdotes 
which I should like to offer here as exempla, as two types not only of the 
artist or thinker, but likewise as illustrations of two sorts of complaining, 
or even as two 
opposed orientations toward all those things about which 
life offers us the endless opportunity to complain. We might call them the 
ancient-heroic versus the modern-pathetic. 
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The first story is apocryphal and concerns Alexander the Great. The tale 
is that when Alexander's conquest-weary and homesick veterans were near 
a decision to mutiny, having been on the march for over three years, he set 
himself high on a platform where the entire army would be able to see 
him, stripped off his robes and showed them that he bore on his own body 
the mark of every known weapon. He said not a word, nothing. The 
army pushed on towards the Gates of India, persuaded, I have always sup 
posed, less by the pain Alexander had personally suffered than that, in 
disclosing his wounds, Alexander showed them a triumph more im 
pressive than the sack of Persepolis. Like the Homeric heroes on whom he 
consciously modeled himself, Alexander was capable of complaining with 
enormous dignity ?so much, in fact, that one might hardly notice it was 
complaining at all. In literature, such complaining is properly called 
tragedy, which is a sort of complaining through not complaining. 
The second story concerns the German Renaissance artist Albrecht D? 
rer; it accounts for one of his more striking self-portraits. According to 
this anecdote, D?rer once fell ill during a journey. Distrusting the medical 
science of the rude village in which he found himself, the artist posted a 
circumstantial account of his symptoms to his personal physician back 
home in Nuremberg. To illustrate this description, he included along 
with his letter a small drawing: a full-length self-portrait in which the 
artist represented himself naked and pointing to the side of his abdomen. 
The caption reads, approximately, "This is where it hurts." 
As I think about the form and style of modern complaining, I cannot 
help but feel that there is little which resembles the self-possessed, tragi 
cally dignified Alexander up on his platform and much that is like D?rer 
drawing out his complaint in a provincial sickroom for an absent Doctor. 
One might almost think that, among the many glossy new anthologies 
offered for sale each spring, at least one ought to be entitled, after D?rer: 
This Is Where It Hurts: An Introduction to Modern Literature. 
The heroic and tragic complaint, like Alexander's, expresses the univer 
sal in the particular; the old Macedonian campaigners could identify them 
selves with their leader. To take another example, Achilles' personal com 
plaint is still that of Achilles 
? a hero and demi-god?yet his heel is as mor 
tal as our own poor flesh is. When in the Iliad he replies to a Trojan's ap 
peal for mercy, Achilles speaks of himself, but explains that there is no 
mercy for any of us. His speech to Lycaon mirrors the stern pathos of 
Alexander's silent appeal to his troops: 
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See what a man I am also, both strong and comely to look on, 
Great was the father who bred me, a goddess the mother who 
bore me; 
Yet over me stand death and overmastering fortune. 
To me a dawn shall come, or a noontide hour, or an evening, 
When some man shall deprive me of life in the heat of battle, 
Casting at me with a spear or an arrow shot from a bowstring. 
It is as if Achilles understood the paradox that his invulnerability would be 
meaningless without his vulnerability. This is the sort of nobility taught 
us by the Greeks, the nobility Nietzsche shrilly complained the nineteenth 
century had destroyed with its endless moralizing and psychologizing, 
lowering the quality of complaining even as it vastly increased the quan 
tity. 
Fate is character. Anyway, this is what I was taught in high school. A 
nice dramatic-psychological idea, of course, illustrated as usual by the stan 
dard high-school reading of Oedipus Rex. And yet how much truer to the 
Greek tragic spirit I found Oedipus' own denial of my teacher's axiom 
when I later came across him complaining forcefully about it at the end of 
his life in Oedipus at Colonus: 
Was I the sinner? 
Repaying wrong for wrong ?that was no sin, 
Even were it wittingly done, as it was not. 
I did not know the way I went. They knew: 
They, who devised this trap for me, they knew. 
Oedipus learns that his freedom can only be expressed in a context of 
necessity. This is a bitter, tragic wisdom, but a wonderfully ennobling 
one, too. In fact, when he finally accepts it, Oedipus becomes sacred, like 
the precincts of Moira, the terrain of Fate itself. But still, he complains. 
He blames them. If this demonstrates nothing else, it at least proves that at 
the end Oedipus is still man, still human, still the answer to the Sphinx's 
riddle. Man complains on four, then two, then three legs. 
This ancient sublimation of the human spirit of complaining in epic or 
tragedy is bound to appear to us now like an expensive and even deceitful 
portrait. I mean the kind in which the photographer has contrived to 
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make his wealthy client look almost hilariously better than in actuality, 
the sort of flattering photo the client wouldn't mind seeing in the 
newspaper or hanging on his children's walls. Nowadays, though, most 
complaining ?even that offered by our public figures ?is far more like the 
snapshots left over from last summer's torrid heat wave. After all, Alex 
ander, Achilles, and Oedipus were heroes and kings. Facing life as they 
did, from the top, they all respected themselves. 
It was Dostoevsky, inventor of the modern anti-hero, who asked 
rhetorically whether an educated, self-aware man of the modern world can 
really respect himself at all. Others have probed here and there, but no 
one, I believe, has poked his finger further into the soft psychology of 
modern, up-to-date complaining than Dostoevsky did. It is a psychology I 
have never felt secure enough to call abnormal. 
Notes from Underground is a short novel in which, to adopt a phrase of 
Woody Allen's, Dostoevsky first succeeded in raising "whining to a high 
art." He does so not through heroic self-possession or tragic wisdom, but 
through raw, suppurating, and ignoble self-consciousness. In Chapter 
Four of Part One of the Notes, the anonymous narrator examines the 
spiteful pleasures of self-conscious complaint. The difference from the 
classic style is most striking. Listen to him improvise on his theme, like 
John Coltrane really letting go: 
I ask you, gentlemen, listen sometimes to the moans of an educated 
man of the nineteenth century suffering from toothache, on the sec 
ond or third day of the attack, when he is beginning to moan, not as 
he moaned on the first day; that is, not simply because he has a tooth 
ache, not just as any coarse peasant, but as a man affected by progress 
and European civilization. . . . His moans become nasty, disgust 
ingly malignant, and go on for whole days and nights. And of course 
he knows himself that he is doing himself no sort of good with his 
moans; he knows better than any one that he is only lacerating and 
harassing himself and others for nothing; he knows that even the au 
dience before whom he is making his efforts and his whole family, 
listen to him with loathing, do not put a kopek's worth of faith in 
him, and inwardly understand that he might moan differently, more 
simply, without trills and flourishes, and that he is only amusing 
himself like that from ill-humor, from malignancy. . . 
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Imagine! Trills and flourishes, and all to say: here is where it hurts, to 
inflict this knowledge on others, on his "whole family." This is not ex 
pressing the universal in the particular, but just the opposite. That is, 
maybe everyone else gets toothaches, but just listen to what my toothache 
is doing to me. Egoistic complaining of this sort is malicious indeed. It is a 
sort of sin. 
Kafka, in one of his penetrating late aphorisms, elevates the concept of 
complaining as sin to the highest conceivable level: 
The original sin, the ancient wrong committed by man, consists in 
the complaint, which man makes and never ceases making, that a 
wrong has been done to him, that the original sin was once commit 
ted upon him. 
Dissatisfaction, not with a toothache ?that is merely a symbol?but 
with reality, with the conditions originally laid down for our ex 
istence?each man and woman with his or her own existence and all men 
and women collectively with existence in general ?this becomes for Kafka 
the first sin, our fall from grace. (Could the ??fallen complain?) Yet such 
complaining is also the serpent that leads us to bite the apple of knowl 
edge: both complaining and biting are aggressive, oral acts. 
Having once set out on this path of knowledge running east from Eden, 
our 
complaints have, moreover, dictated the program of our astonishing 
discoveries. Gravity, inertia, illness, aging ?such conditions we have tried 
to overcome through our inventiveness: with our airplanes, drugs, and 
tummy-tucks. One might easily suppose Dostoevsky's Petersburg in 
tellectual would fare better in the days of dental bonding and Novocain. 
But if the sin is really the original one, then this complaining must be both 
universal and perpetual, ineradicable even by scientific progress or Califor 
nian self-help healers. 
Woody Allen's self-deprecating persona is at its best a burlesque of 
Dostoevsky's narrator. In effect, between the former's St. Petersburg and 
the latter's Manhattan there is no difference except a hundred years of 
human inventiveness and modern literature, which breeds the ironic and 
unavoidable knowledge of what is intractable to even a century of science 
and literature: 
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Science has failed us. True, it has conquered many diseases, broken 
the genetic code and even placed a man on the moon, and yet when a 
man of eighty is left in a room with two eighteen-year-old cocktail 
waitresses nothing happens. Because the real problems never change. 
What can we do about these real problems that never change? We can ac 
cept them in silence; we can complain about them as beautifully and even 
as gaily as possible, but there is something else we can also do: we can pro 
test. We can protest because we must, because who knows whether the 
real problems that never change may turn out to be really changeable after 
all? We can also protest in order to remind others that the real problems 
are 
really problems. 
We can assert our personal protests in the strongest terms. We have a 
long tradition of it. For example, in one of Kierkegaard's books an ir 
ritable young man writes of our whole vast business concern of a universe 
as follows: 
How did I obtain an interest in this big enterprise they call reality? Is 
it not a voluntary concern? And if I am to be compelled to take part 
in it, where is the director? I should like to make a remark to him. Is 
there no director? Whither shall I turn with my complaint? Ex 
istence is surely a debate ?may I beg that my view be taken into con 
sideration? 
Well, this is how intellectuals complain, and one should never 
underestimate the complaints of the intellectuals. Karl Marx, for instance, 
was for a long time troubled by a skin disorder and was not reluctant to 
complain about it. He is said to have remarked, while composing Das 
Kapital, "The capitalists will have cause to regret my carbuncles!" 
Before we get carried away with the moral worthiness of complaining 
as protest, however, it should be admitted that complaining is also a thing 
many people do long before everything else has failed. This is plainly ir 
ritating, and here is an example. I have often to review the evaluations 
students make of my colleagues, the marketing reports on their pedagogy, 
so to 
speak. Not long ago I read a complaint recorded by a dissatisfied 
undergraduate: "Professor X. is far too demanding of and unsympathetic 
toward his students. It is useless to talk to him about the material when 
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you haven't read any of it." It may be noted that complaining sometimes 
creates respect for that about which the complaint is lodged ?especially 
when the complaint is manifestly premature. 
Complaining can also be a sort of parasitic mood. Certain kinds of 
behavior are like viruses: they inject themselves into an organism and 
establish conditions in which they are able to reproduce like mad, the poor 
host be damned. I believe some people are afflicted with their complaining 
in just this viral way. In such cases, complaining would be as uncon 
trollable by the complainer as a fever is by its victim. At best, such a person 
might be able to channel his or her complaints; eliminating them is out of 
the question. One sees this sort of thing most clearly in young children, 
with whom a bad mood is always on the surface and with whom com 
plaints multiply themselves rather indiscriminately: first they hate the 
meat loaf, then the milk, their clothes, bed-time, and their siblings. But at 
least children do not mask complaints as something else. In adults, this 
chronic viral complaining can take on many odd, protective colorations: 
for instance, pounding out the "Revolutionary Etude" or devoting long 
essays to the subject of complaining. Such grown-up activities are known 
as displacements or sublimations, suggesting that they are at least okay 
with psychologists. Give your whining an air of high culture, put it down 
in octava rima or daub it in bold acrylics and people won't be so annoyed 
with you. On the contrary, a few of them may even invite you to dinner. 
But meanwhile, the viral devil of complaining ?the passive dissatisfac 
tion, the profound dis-ease ?goes on eating away at the organism which 
now calls itself artistic and arrogates to itself as many privileges as that 
dignified claim will win. In this way, complaining can even become quite 
necessary to the artist ?not surprisingly, as he will, not without some 
justice, begin to call it inspiration. Nor is this process of sublimated com 
plaining limited to poets or musicians. 
Some lawyers are very good at it: talented ones soon become masters of 
reflexive courtroom objection and the very best are capable of inventing 
entirely new kinds of civil litigation. The difference between mere whin 
ing litigiousness anda genuine thirst for justice may be absolute; however, 
as this distinction is a wholly interior one, it is very difficult from the out 
side to tell which is which. This must be why our courts are congenitally 
clogged with complaints. Indeed, the large if not excessive number of 
lawyers employed in the United States suggests that formal complaining 
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is, for Americans, not only a way of doing business but virtually a national 
pastime. After all, as I recall, one of the major sources of the American na 
tional consciousness was a series of famous complaints about British 
economic and defense policy in the eighteenth century. The American 
Revolution was, in many ways, a revolution made by lawyers. This 
proves nothing against the sources of American patriotism, Heaven 
knows, but it does reveal that the spirit of complaint can lead to highly 
consequential and liberating actions. An irritation can suggest a new train 
of thought, new thoughts can beget protests, and protests may lead to in 
surrections. This was clearly understood in the old feudal days when, if 
somebody complained about the King, he could be brought up on a charge 
of l?se-majest? and dealt with as a traitor. 
My point here is that free thought is unimaginable without complain 
ing, though complaining is no more a sign of independent thinking than 
tuberculosis is of literary genius. It's just that, historically, the two have 
often been found together. 
So, to complain has a legal meaning as well as a psychological one. To 
lay a complaint before a court is to assert that an injustice exists and to seek 
its redress. In this sense, George Orwell's cautionary novel 1984 is a very 
complicated complaint, meticulous and imaginative, an extrapolation 
from an unacceptable present to an entirely repulsive future. The connec 
tion between the present and future is not only real, it is sometimes quite 
personal. Orwell gave the number of the room in which he labored during 
the war to the dreaded torture chamber in which Winston Smith con 
fronts the rat. But, of course, the novel is hardly personal; it is a protest, a 
legal complaint seeking an injunction, a restraining order, asking nothing 
less than justice and sanity for the world-at-large. 
In fact, Orwell's whole career was that of a profoundly protestant 
writer. He was a man who complained constantly not that an injustice had 
been done to him, but rather that human decency was being multifari 
ously outraged in his time. 
When I first read 1984 as a boy the fact about it which most impressed 
me was that Winston Smith, the novel's protagonist, was born in the 
same year as myself. Now we are both forty. I am, of course, infinitely 
better off than Winston Smith. So far as I am aware, I do not even share 
his varicose ulcer, the wound of his oppressed individuality; that is, the 
physiological manifestation of many repressed complaints and stifled pro 
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tests. But I cannot wholly escape the idea that Orwell's book was meant in 
some 
special way for my own generation, for all of us once whining and 
protesting, but lately more accommodating baby-boomers. 
I have therefore endeavored to remain mindful of his complaints and 
warnings about such things as the betrayals of which intellectuals are fully 
and perpetually capable, that Utopian schemes generally tend toward con 
trolled insanity, that indoctrination is ever ready to substitute itself for 
education (noting especially that in Orwell's Oceania only those who have 
no intellect are granted intellectual liberty), that the abolition of privacy 
spells the annihilation of the individual, and that a science dominated by 
government is likely to be reduced to examining only two questions: how 
to read the minds of human beings and how to kill large numbers of them 
without warning. 
But none of these protests 
? 
serious and ever-timely as they are? con 
stitutes Orwell's special complaint, the uniquely Orwellian gripe. Others 
have seen these things too, but absolutely no one has seen more clearly or 
complained more eloquently about the pernicious political and moral 
effects of the perversion of language. No one argues so lucidly or less 
school-marmishly that the degeneration of language is, in fact, equally a 
cause and an effect of cultural and political corruption. For example, 
Orwell observed that the weakening of language encourages us to accept 
words without examining their relation to objective reality. Our thought 
is impoverished and the truth obscured by clangorous slogans and 
reiterated nonsense. Orwell's historical sources for such political concerns 
are obvious enough: there are Stalin's grand dictates on the collectivization 
of Soviet agriculture, Mussolini up on his balcony fulminating about the 
grandeur of Imperial Rome, or Hitler screeching about the future of the 
Fatherland. 
For my generation, however, these dictatorial linguistic grotesqueries 
were at first only of historical interest. At most, they appeared to us 
trivialized in the comparatively crude advertising of the 1950s. However, 
in the mid-1960s, just as we came of age, the debasement of political 
discourse about which Orwell complained suddenly appeared before us in 
all its ignoble obfuscatory panoply and has yet to go away. 
There was something called the Pacification Program in Viet Nam, for 
example. To pacify means to make peaceful, as when a screaming baby is 
given a rubber nipple to suck on. "War is Peace," says Oceania's Inner 
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Party. Why not reverse it? Pacification was, of course, war. People were 
removed from villages of questionable loyalty to crowded camps, the 
villages burned, along with crops and domestic animals. As a Roman once 
said of a similar program: "They make a desolation and call it peace." 
There was something called the Phoenix Program, which seemed to en 
tail the systematic assassination of civilians suspected of communist sym 
pathies and not the rebirth of some fabled fire-bird in Arizona. 
Notice also that these things were called "programs." Programs sound 
rather good in themselves. A program suggests a well-organized thing, 
something to watch on television or to feed neatly into your clean main 
frame. It is a useful word. 
At certain moments the war became almost literally a war of words. For 
instance, I recall that the Nixon Administration became rather indignant 
with journalists who insisted on referring to the invasions of Laos and 
Cambodia in 1970 as invasions. These were merely "incursions" the Ad 
ministration declared warmly. Evidently they felt an incursion would be 
more 
appealing to the electorate than an invasion, and perhaps they were 
right. All the same, anyone with a dictionary could have discovered that 
incursion and invasion are essentially synonymous. The point is that the 
word is softer and implies something minor and brief, a headache rather 
than cancer. Throughout the war the official language-game seemed to be 
to find soft words for hard ones, abstract words for concrete ones, 
palliative jargon in which to swathe embarrassing facts. And all this oc 
curred at just the moment when television journalism gave the lie to the 
Pentagon's lexicon of softness, abstraction, and palliation. 
Yet television itself, with its battering montage, its vast emptiness full 
of images, can stupefy no less effectively than Newspeak can. It is this that 
leads me to complain now and again that one true word would be worth a 
thousand pictures. Winston Smith, a kind of historian after all, might 
have felt the same way. He was not a photographer, but a diarist. 
Anyway, the specific linguistic perversions Orwell complains about are 
by now fairly common 
? 
though fortunately there are still plenty of people 
around to complain about them. For instance, in Newspeak, as in the Pen 
tagon, nouns become verbs and vice-versa. In Newspeak there is no longer 
the word 
"thought." Its place is taken by "think," as "cut" is by "knife." 
Already we are practically surrounded by think-tanks and politicians 
famous for knifing through their own red tape. Orwell predicted that the 
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"ly" ending of adverbs is doomed to be replaced. Madison Avenue became 
notorious for this two decades ago and the suffix "wise" ?if I remember 
rightly ?turns up now and then on the Nixon tapes, which is not surpris 
ing, since he surrounded himself with advertising men like Haldeman. 
"Will that story go over well public-relations-wise?" they ask, while over 
at the Pentagon they were perhaps inquiring, "How's that new bomb, 
kill-wise?" 
It isn't just the government, of course. Students fall into error a good 
deal, too. For instance, Orwell is very sharp on "un" constructions, as in 
unfree and ungood. I have often heard students falsely describing abso 
lutely genuine events as "unreal" or things they entirely credit as "unbe 
lievable." This sort of thing ought to be quite unacceptable. 
Orwell complains also of the characteristic Newspeak device of making 
new 
compound words ?thoughtcrime, goodsex, oldthink, blackwhite. 
Time magazine used to make a specialty of this, inventing cute neologisms 
like "cinemactress." Agitprop, Gestapo, Comintern, and Nazi are older 
examples, compound abbreviations which had the original advantage of 
cutting out undesirable associations. Some years back, Standard Oil Com 
pany of New Jersey, which used to go by the Orwellian name of Esso, 
spent a terrific sum of money to change its name to Exxon and then ran ads 
selling itself as our buddy, ally, and servant ?rather like Big Brother, in 
fact. Should people have complained that they were selling themselves and 
not just gasoline? 
The distorted languages of business and of politics intersect in the adver 
tising agency, which often aims at the same kind of compliant un 
consciousness as the Inner Party favored in its clients. After all, a campaign 
is a campaign and every election brings us more media-consultants. 
Whether the purpose is more sales or more votes, the methods are pretty 
much the same: lulling the mind, defusing the sense of reality, invoking 
authority, bandwagons, nostalgia, and the religion of technology. Con 
sider just the last: nobody uses a razor anymore. We use "shaving 
systems" like the TRAC-2 shaving system in which, of course, Trac is 
spelled incorrectly. You'd think that this fourth-generation chromium 
plated stainless-steel double-edged teflon-enhanced quasi-scientific marvel 
was too good for merely scraping whiskers or for anything less than slit 
ting your throat in high style. 
Like Winston Smith's, our telescreens, albeit still one-way for the mo 
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ment, are full of Newspeak too. Take Orwell's device of the standardized 
adjective. In Newspeak, he says, there will be precious few of them be 
cause this will greatly lessen the chance of a fresh or accurate view of real 
ity. The Inner Party favors stereotyping in particular and muddy thinking 
in general ?or mudthinkfulness 
? 
which is greatly furthered by constantly 
using the same words. The press seems unable to report on a legal brief 
without putting the word "lengthy" in front of it. Except in underwear 
ads, there are no brief briefs on television. In the same way, the House 
Ways and Means Committee is regularly "powerful" while the Rules 
Committee is always "all-important." Truces in the Middle East are per 
petually "uneasy," perhaps because the place is crowded with sheikdoms 
that are all "oil-rich," and enduring visits from "globe-trotting" 
secretaries-of-state who are fleeing "spiralling" inflation (or another 
"short-term" recession) back home, so that they can "officially" protest 
"alleged repressive" measures "necessitated" by the activities of "left 
wing" guerillas who are "communist-backed" by threatening retaliation 
that promises to be "massive." 
By all means let us complain with Orwell about such leaden and deaden 
ing clich?s. It should not be that the very thing most citizens do to become 
informed about the world should prevent them from thinking clearly 
about what is going on. Let the machines be the receivers, not the 
watchers. And let us be grateful to George Orwell for his complaining no 
less than for his love of the English language. 
So we have made it through both 1984s, still complaining, still free to 
complain, at least if we live in the right countries. Back in the 60s ?when 
my generation told itself not to trust anyone over thirty ?our complaints 
were memorable when of high quality; petulant, callow, and self 
righteous when otherwise. But the habit of griping is hard to break. So 
now, when we have told ourselves not to trust anyone under thirty, my 
coevals are complaining still, though the relative complacency of the pres 
ent rather tends toward the trivialization and narrowing of complaint. In 
terest rates get more play than social justice these days. In fact, instead of 
outraged idealism, I hear more outrage at idealism. This new hard-headed, 
bottom-line (or middle-aged) appraisal of life by the baby-boomers casts a 
curious shadow over the next generation, many of whom are, so to speak, 
uncertain of just what to complain about for the rest of the century. Their 
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attitude toward those of us who were their age in the 60s remains pro 
foundly ambivalent: on the one hand, I think they envy us our youthful 
and innocent certainty about our objects of protest, while, on the other, 
they are quick to see selfishness underlying the apparently indignant 
altruism of twenty years ago. They also envy our nostalgia, but rightly 
suspect it is often mere sentimentality and even a way of beating them over 
the head with the Beatles, Janis Joplin, and Dr. Spock. They wonder at 
the old far-reaching radicalism, but are quick to observe with a smile that 
such daring didn't so much fail as it was outlived, as if it were just like any 
other fad. They marvel at the freedom of the 60s, at the motley variety of 
lives they spawned, but also understand that the 60s were years of rising 
economic expectations which could underwrite a kind of luxurious 
silliness. They themselves do not seem to desire such a wide variety of 
styles in living, but rather something very particular, something along the 
lines of what life is like on Dynasty, Dallas, or other country-club soap 
operas. True, these young are modest; they do not tend to formulate 
grand, far-seeing complaints, apart from a rather hopeless feeling about 
nuclear annihilation when the thought strikes them?but they are not 
short on immediate ones: work loads, the weather, criticism. Non aequus 
est. It is not that they are uncritical or inarticulate about the Big Ques 
tions, but rather, I think, that they are plainly fearful, and fear makes for 
silence. Paradoxically, a degree of confidence and security is required to 
complain well. Complaining, like hope, depends on faith in the future. 
The more protected the child ?the more pampered, assured, and the less 
afraid ?the more it is liable to whine. To be blunt, I think the young who 
are middle-class are afraid of falling out of it, afraid that the system which 
offers such enormous material rewards may withhold its benefits or might 
even crush them should they make the wrong move. Given this, it is 
natural that they should mistrust or nervously mock complaining in the 
grand style. Moreover, one does not protest a system in which one is striv 
ing to triumph. 
Even after all this, though, I must admit that complaining may be 
almost pointless, but in this narrow "almost" there remains much to con 
sider. There is in it room not only for whining, breast-beating, the cruder 
forms of brattish self-assertion; there is also lodging for a proof of life, for 
sensitivity to irritation, space for the hope that things might be better than 
they are. I can only think of three sorts of people who do not complain in 
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some way: the smugly complacent, the totally repressed, and the utterly 
despairing. My great respect for the silence of the Stoics and my detesta 
tion of the whining of the well-off notwithstanding, I cannot consider any 
of these conditions desirable. 
Of course spoiled people do complain?in fact, they do little else?but 
not all complainants are spoiled. Besides, there is a purely social element in 
complaining which should not be overlooked. I believe many close friend 
ships are owing to it. People who go through the truly complaint-worthy 
ordeals of life together (such as military training or their freshman years) 
tend to remain remarkably close, for they share the ineffable bond of hav 
ing griped in common. This discourse called griping ought not to be 
undervalued as a precious lubricant in slipping us through abrasive times. 
Indeed, I think many complaints are really only a form of etiquette. One is 
not 
expected to like one's drill sergeant, freshman composition class, in 
stitutional food, rush-hour traffic, or crowded trolleys. Complaining, like 
shaking hands, gives one something comforting to do with strangers in 
barracks, cafeterias, classrooms and subways. 
Complaining will cut us off from others if we only bewail our private 
fates; but it can connect us with others if we join ourselves to the human 
condition by it. There is a fine illustration of just these alternatives in the 
Talmud, an anecdote about the saintly rabbi Hanina ben Dosa, whose 
complaining prayers were evidently always answered instantly. Here is the 
whole story: 
Rabbi Hanina was once walking along when it began to rain. At once 
he complained to God: "Lord of the World, all the world is at ease, only 
Hanina is in distress." 
At once the rain stopped. 
But when the rabbi reached his house he complained again. "Lord of the 
World, all the world is in distress, only Hanina is at ease." 
And the rain started to fall once again. 
Hanina's second complaint is the noble one. In the end, he did not pray 
that he should be better off, but that he should be no better off than 
others; not that he should rise above, but that he should share in the com 
mon fate; essentially that it should rain on the just as well as the unjust. 
The second complaint joins him to mankind and, in doing so, cancels the 
first. 
One need not be a prophet to predict that people will go on complain 
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ing: no matter how glittering the future turns out to be, it will certainly 
displease somebody. Besides, as Virginia said, complaining is a fundamen 
tal human talent and, as such, necessary and not to be despised. We should 
develop all our talents. According to Kafka, we humans never cease to 
complain of the original sin, especially when we are in the process of com 
mitting it. And so people will undoubtedly go on complaining no matter 
what. But we can still choose our objects; we can still perfect our style. If 
art is complaint, then complaint can be art. So, to conclude, here are two 
final examples of really first-class complaining. They may stand as models. 
The first is one of Heinrich von Kleist 's anecdotes: 
A Franciscan, one very rainy day, was accompanying a Swabian 
prisoner to the gallows. The man complained to Heaven all the way 
of having to walk so gloomy a path in such wet and unfriendly 
weather. The Franciscan, wishing to offer some Christian solace, 
replied: 'Lout that you are! How can you complain? You have only 
to get there, but I, in all this rain, must walk all the way back again.' 
The last is a most elegant and superbly polite complaint which is at 
tributed to no less a personage than Abraham Lincoln: 
Madam, if this is coffee, please bring me some tea; but if this is tea, 
please bring me some coffee. 
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